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LEAGUE TO
ENFORCE PEACE

AMERICAN BRANCH

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT
PRESIDENT

LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE
AMERICAN BRANCH


League to Enforce Peace

AMERICAN BRANCH

Independence Hall Conference held
in the City of Philadelphia, Bunker
Hill Day (June 17th), 1915, together
with the speeches made at a public
banquet in the Bellevue-Stratford
Hotel on the preceding evening.

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THE CALL FOR THE CONFERENCE

THE NATIONAL PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE

WHOSE NAMES APPEAR ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE
HAVE THE HONOR TO INVITE

TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE
WHICH WILL BE HELD IN INDEPENDENCE HALL, PHILADELPHIA
ON THURSDAY, THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE
ONE THOUSAND, NINE HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN
FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING THE ADOPTION OF PROPOSALS
FOR A

LEAGUE OF PEACE

AND DECIDING UPON STEPS TO BE TAKEN WITH A VIEW TO
OBTAINING THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC OPINION
AND OF GOVERNMENTS

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT
FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
WILL PRESIDE

IF YOU ARE IN SYMPATHY WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE
CONFERENCE BUT UNABLE TO ATTEND
A LETTER CONTAINING YOUR SUGGESTIONS WILL BE APPRECIATED

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LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE
AMERICAN BRANCH

WARRANT FROM HISTORY

THROUGHOUT five thousand years of recorded history peace, here and there established, has been kept, and its area has been widened, in one way only. Individuals have combined their efforts to suppress violence in the local community. Communities have co-operated to maintain the authoritative state and to preserve peace within its borders. States have formed leagues or confederations, or have otherwise co-operated, to establish peace among themselves. Always peace has been made and kept, when made and kept at all, by the superior power of superior numbers acting in unity for the common good.

Mindful of this teaching of experience, we believe and solemnly urge that the time has come to devise and to create a working union of sovereign nations to establish peace among themselves and to guarantee it by all known and available sanctions at their command, to the end that civilization may be conserved, and the progress of mankind in comfort, enlightenment and happiness may continue.

PLATFORM

It is desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

Second: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article One.

THE HISTORY OF THE CONFERENCE

WILLIAM H. SHORT, Secretary

AN AMERICAN statesman, perhaps the leading authority in this country on international questions, in conversation with the writer in August, 1914, declared it to be the present duty of all friends of civilization, clearly to understand and to teach the lessons from the great war and to prepare for the ultimate reorganization of world society on a basis which would prevent for the future the mistaken policies and the enormous armaments which had led to the present conflict. He expressed the opinion that it would be possible to utilize the extraordinary situation brought about by the war to apply principles of statecraft which would start the world off on a new and better tack when the war was over.

By the end of January of the present year, a large number of individuals and groups in this and other countries had reached the conclusion that an effective reorganization such as was suggested could take place only by the establishment of a league of nations which should agree to use their joint military forces as a police to discourage aggression and to keep the peace.

The history of diplomatic negotiations at the close of the great wars of the past had made it clear that the wishes of democracies can have little weight at such times unless they are clearly formulated and those who cherish them are organized for effective action. This fact led many of the men who had reached the conclusion that the organization of a League of Peace offered the most favorable method

for preventing future wars, to the opinion that the time had arrived for a concerted effort to unify and focus opinion on this plan. The lack of unity and the confusion of mind among those who hoped for better things at the close of the present war, seemed to accentuate the urgency of the matter.

At the end of January, 1915, a series of conferences were begun at the Century Association with the object of discovering the principles on which a successful league to maintain peace must be constructed. The group was composed of about thirty men—professors of political science and international law, statesmen and students of public affairs. Their object was, first, to construct a constitution for an effective league and, after this had been done, to determine what portion of this desirable program ought now to be urged upon our own and other Governments as a realizable project. After conferences extending through three months, results had been reached on which they were substantially united and it was determined to call a national conference in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, for the purpose of bringing their proposals prominently to the attention of the people of America and the world.

The four articles, into which the constitution for the proposed league had been cast, were signed by the one hundred and twenty prominent citizens whose names are appended to the call of the conference as printed in this volume, and invitations were sent out to several hundred men asking them to assemble on June 17th to consider the wisdom of the proposals, and, if they were approved, to take steps to bring them to the favorable attention of a larger public.

Three hundred men responded to the call. A banquet, attended by both ladies and gentlemen, took place at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel, on the

preceding evening, and gave opportunity for a full preliminary presentation of the considerations which had led to the forming of the proposals and the assembling of the conference. The mayor of Philadelphia presided and the addresses were made by Messrs. Hamilton Holt, George Gray, Oscar S. Straus, A. Lawrence Lowell and William Howard Taft. These appear under proper headings in the following pages.

At half after ten o'clock on the next morning, June 17th, the conference was called to order in the historic Independence Hall, in behalf of the Provisional Committee, by Mr. Thomas Raeburn White of Philadelphia, who placed in nomination, as President, the Hon. William Howard Taft. Mr. Taft was unanimously chosen by acclamation and, in an opening address, referred to precedents which justified the proposals which had been laid before the conference by the Provisional Committee, also pointing out the fact that the step which the Conference had assembled to urge was not a very long one when looked at from the standpoint of history.

After the election of other officers of the conference and the appointment of committees, addresses were made by Messrs. Theodore Marburg, John Bates Clark, and Edward A. Filene, which are printed in substance in this volume.

Article three of the proposals laid before the conference by the Provisional Committee was as follows:

That the signatory powers shall jointly use their military force to prevent any one of their number from going to war, or committing acts of hostility, against any other of the signatories, before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

Mr. Filene in his address offered a substitute in the following language:

That the signatory powers shall support, by such concerted measures, diplomatic, economic and military, as in the judgment of the majority may be most effective, any one of their number that is attacked without previous submission of the dispute to judgment or conciliation, as provided in the foregoing.

The amendment was referred, without debate, to the Resolutions Committee in accordance with a rule of the conference previously adopted.

The chairman then stated that the articles of the League, as proposed by the Provisional Committee, would be referred to the Resolutions Committee for deliberation and report and that the submission of additional resolutions was in order. Several gentlemen were given the floor under the five-minute rule for the purpose mentioned. Among these was Colonel William Dudley Foulke of Indiana, who moved the insertion in the first article of the resolutions, after the words "not settled by negotiation," the words "and not otherwise provided for by the terms of the League itself," so that the first clause should read:

All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, and not otherwise provided for by the terms of the League itself, shall be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment both on the merits and on any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

An inquiry from the representatives of the press as to the name by which the conference desired to have the permanent organization called was also referred to the Committee on Resolutions. Several additional resolutions were presented and referred. At one o'clock the conference took a recess of two hours, its members being invited as the guests at luncheon of Mr. Frederic H. Strawbridge. The Re-

solutions Committee met at the same hour as the guests of Mr. Charles J. Rhoads for action on the resolutions that had been submitted.

At three o'clock the conference was called to order and was led in prayer by the Rev. Jenkin Lloyd Jones of Chicago. A resolution was adopted tendering to Mr. Strawbridge the thanks of the conference for his hospitality. The treasurer of the conference, Mr. Herbert S. Houston, who had passed subscription papers among its members at the morning session, announced that at that session \$1,313 had been subscribed, that \$100 additional had come in during the luncheon recess and that opportunity would be given for subscribing additional funds for the expenses of the conference and the work of the permanent organization which it was purposed to establish. The chairman of the Resolutions Committee was called to the platform and presented the report which appears on page 58.

The chairman of the conference finding it necessary to leave at this time to fulfill an imperative engagement elsewhere, called to the chair the Hon. John Bassett Moore of New York, delivering the farewell injunction printed on page 63. After Mr. Taft's departure remarks on the report of the Resolutions Committee were made by Congressman David J. Lewis of Maryland, Judge William H. Wadhams of New York, Hon. Victor Berger of Wisconsin, Rev. Junius B. Remensnyder, D. D., of New York, Mr. Chester DeWitt Pugsley of New York, Hon. John Wanamaker of Pennsylvania, Prof. George W. Kirchwey of New York and the Rev. Vernon I'Anson of Virginia.

Amendments to the report of the Resolutions Committee were moved as follows:

That the title of the League be not "League to Enforce Peace," but "League to Establish and Maintain Peace."

and, secondly,

That the signatories are to be bound to the first, second and fourth resolutions indicated and that the third be cut out.

In behalf of the Resolutions Committee, its chairman defended the report which had been made. Declaring that the proposed amendments touched the exact point for which the Conference had assembled, he said:

The question before us is, shall we run the risk of war to prevent war, or shall we say, "let war go on and we will wash our hands of it, for we will never touch the carnal weapon." That seems to me, Mr. Chairman, to be the exact point that lies before us. The one thing which we are here to consider is not the ideal of peace. There are plenty of societies for that, and we all agree about it. We are here because we think that we have a means which will discourage war, and that means of discouraging war is the threat of the use of force. We are here to state an object, which is that the great countries of the world ought to combine by the threat of war to prevent useless warfare.

The Chairman: I will put the first amendment, that the title of the League be made "A League to Establish and Maintain Peace." All in favor of that amendment will please say aye.

A division was called for, a vote was taken and the amendment lost.

The Chairman: The second amendment is that the third clause in the resolution, with regard to the use of force, be stricken out.

A viva voce vote was taken and the amendment lost.

The adoption of the resolutions as reported by the Resolutions Committee was moved, the motion was put and the resolutions were adopted with apparently two dissenting votes.

The Chairman: The ayes have it and the resolutions are carried. (Great Applause.)

A permanent organization was established as indicated on pages 63-64. A resolution of thanks "to the organization extending us the invitation and to the hospitable persons who have entertained us while in Philadelphia and to the officers of the meeting" was adopted, after which the conference adjourned at approximately five o'clock to the call of the Executive Committee.

The Hon. RUDOLPH BLANKENBURG

MAYOR OF PHILADELPHIA

ON BEHALF of the City of Brotherly Love, I extend to you gentlemen a sincere and hearty welcome. You did well in choosing Philadelphia as the place of your initial conference. William Penn, the founder of our city, was a man of peace, a humane man, who abhorred war. It is more than appropriate to inaugurate this splendid movement for world peace in Independence Hall, the cradle of American Liberty, with all its hallowed associations.

A further reason why Philadelphia should be selected is the fact, perhaps unknown to many of you, that the first suggestion for international arbitration of the Alabama Claims came from one of Philadelphia's distinguished citizens, Thomas Balch. When dark clouds had gathered on the horizon following the depredations of the Alabama, Thomas Balch proposed to President Lincoln as early as November 1864, to submit the Alabama Claims for settlement to an international court of justice to be composed of three jurists. Our martyred President could not at that time be persuaded that Mr. Balch's scheme of arbitration was practicable, but it finally did prevail, and thus the first step towards the principle of international arbitration in that matter was taken. This masterstroke of statesmanship will ever redound to the credit and fame of its author. We are ever eager to erect monuments in honor of heroes of war. Had war instead of peaceful arbitration settled the dispute, we should to-day probably find innumerable shafts and costly

monuments in memory of the heroes of battles fought and won. Thanks to the initiative of Thomas Balch, war was avoided and peaceful settlement made. The hero of peace should at all times be placed before the hero of war.

We do not know what the results of this conference may be, but, with the earnest men at its head, with the support of all citizens who believe in civilized peace, I promise great results. Let us hope that from the cradle of the infant nation of 1776 there may spring a world-wide movement for universal peace that will endure through all the ages.

The Hon. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

MAYOR BLANKENBURG and our fellow seekers after Peace:—We thank you for your cordial greeting. In calling this meeting my associates and I have not been unaware that we might be likened to the Tailors of Tooley Street who mistook themselves for the People of England. We wish first to say that we do not represent anybody but ourselves. We are not National Legislators, nor do we control the foreign policy of this Government. But we are deeply interested in devising a plan for an International agreement by which, when this present war shall cease, a recurrence of such a war will be made less possible.

We are not here to suggest a means of bringing this war to an end; much as that is to be desired and much as we would be willing to do to secure peace, that is not within the project of the present meeting.

We hope and pray for peace, and our hopes of its coming is sufficient to make us think that the present is a good time to discuss and formulate a series of

proposals to which the assent of a number of the great powers could be secured. We think a League of Peace could be formed which would enable nations to avoid war by furnishing a practical means of settling international quarrels, or suspending them until the blinding heat of passion had cooled.

When the World Conference is held, our country will have its official representatives to speak for us. We, Tailors of Tooley Street, will not be there, but if in our prandial leisure we shall have discussed and framed a practical plan for a League of Peace, our official representatives will be aided and may in their discretion accept it and present it to the Conference as their own.

There are Tooley Streets in every nation to-day and the minds of earnest men are being stirred with the same thought and the same purpose—We have heard from them through various channels. The denizens of those Tooley Streets will have their influence upon their respective official representatives. No man can measure the effect upon the peoples of the Belligerent Countries and upon the peoples of the Neutral Countries which the horrors and exhaustion of this unprecedented war are going to have. It is certain that they all will look with much more favorable eye to leagues for the preservation of peace than ever before. In no war, moreover, has the direct interest that neutrals have in preventing a war between neighbors been so clearly made known. This interest of neutrals has been so forced upon them that it would require only a slight development and growth in the law of international relations to develop that interest into a right to be consulted before such a war among neighbors can be begun. This step we hope to have taken by the formation of a Peace League of the Great Powers, *whose primary and fundamental principle shall be that*

no war can take place between any two members of the League until they have resorted to the machinery that the League proposes to furnish to settle the controversy likely to lead to war.

If any member of the League refuses to use this machinery, and attacks another member in breach of his League obligation, all members of the League agree to defend the members attacked by force.

We do not think the ultimate resort to force can be safely omitted from an effective League of Peace. We sincerely hope that it may never become necessary, and that the deterrent effect of its inevitable use in case of a breach of the League obligation will help materially to give sanction to the laws of the League and to render a resort to force avoidable.

We are not peace-at-any-price men, because we do not think we have reached the time when a plan based on the complete abolition of war is practicable. As long as nations partake of the frailties of men who compose them, war is a possibility and that possibility should not be ignored in any League of Peace that is to be useful. We do not think it necessary to call peace-at-any-price men cowards, or apply other epithets to them. We have known in history the most noble characters who adhered to such a view and yet whose physical and moral courage is a heritage of mankind. To those who differ with us in our view of the necessity for this feature of possible force in our plan, we say we respect your attitude. We admit your claim to sincere patriotism to be as just as ours. We do not ascribe your desire to avoid war to be a fear of death to yourselves or your sons; but rather to your sense of the horror, injustice and ineffectiveness of settling any international issue by such a brutal arbitrament. Nevertheless, we differ with you in judgment that in the world of nations as they are, war

can be completely avoided. We believe it is still necessary to use a threat of overwhelming force of a great League with a willingness to make the threat good in order to frighten nations into a use of rational and peaceful means to settle their issues with their associates of the League. Nor are we militarists or jingoes—we are trying to follow a middle and practical path.

Now what is the machinery, a resort to which we wish to force on an intending belligerent of the League. It consists of two tribunals, to one of which every issue must be submitted. Issues between nations are of two classes:—

1st. Issues that can be decided on principles of international law and equity, called justiciable.

2nd. Issues that cannot be decided on such principles of law and equity, but which might be quite as irritating and provocative of war, called non-justiciable.

The questions of the Alaskan Boundary, of the Bering Sea Seal Fisheries, and of the Alabama Claims were justiciable issues that could be settled by a court, exactly as the Supreme Court would settle claims between States.

The questions whether the Japanese should be naturalized, whether all American citizens should be admitted to Russia as merchants without regard to religious faith, are capable of causing great irritation against the nation denying the privilege, and yet such nations, in the absence of a treaty on the subject, are completely within their international right and the real essence of the trouble can not be aided by a resort to a court. The trouble is non-justiciable.

We propose that for justiciable questions we shall have an impartial court to which all questions arising between members of the League shall be submitted.

If the court finds the question justiciable, it shall decide it. If it does not, it shall refer it to a Commission of Conciliation to investigate, confer, hear argument and recommend a compromise.

We do not propose in our plan, to enforce compliance either with the Court's judgment or the Conciliation Commission's recommendation. We feel that we ought not to attempt too much. We believe that the forced submission, the truce taken to investigate and the judicial decision, or the conciliatory compromise recommended will form a material inducement to peace. It will cool the heat of passion and will give the men of peace in each nation time to still the jingoes.

The League of Peace will furnish a great opportunity for more definite formulation of the principles of international law. The arbitral court will amplify it and enrich it in their application of its general principles to particular cases. They will create a body of judge-made laws of the highest value.

Then the existence of the League will lead to ever recurring congresses of the League, which, acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, may widen the scope of international law in a way that a court may not feel able or competent to do.

This is our plan. It is not complicated, at least in statement. In its practical application, difficulties now unforeseen may arise, but we believe it offers a working hypothesis upon which a successful arrangement can be made.

We are greeted first by the objection that no treaties can prevent war. We are not called upon to deny this in order to justify or vindicate our proposals as useful. We realize that nations are sometimes utterly immoral in breaking treaties and shamelessly bold in avowing their right to do so on the ground of

necessity. But this is not always the case. We cannot give up treaties because sometimes they are broken any more than we can give up commercial contracts because men sometimes dishonor themselves in breaking them. We decline to assume that all nations are always dishonorable or that a solemn treaty obligation will not have some deterrent effect upon a nation which has plighted its faith, to prevent its breach. In every nation there are people who are in favor of peace and opposed to war, and when you furnish a treaty that binds the nation not to go to war, you strengthen the hands of the people in that nation that do not want to go to war and are in favor of preserving the honor of the nation. When we add to this the sanction of an agreement by a number of powerful nations to enforce the obligation of the recalcitrant and faithless member, we think we have a treaty that is much more than a "scrap of paper"—and we base our faith in this on a common sense view of human nature.

We have got to depart from the traditional policy of this country, I agree. But this war has borne in on us the fact that we are so near to all the nations of the world to-day that we are vitally interested in keeping war down as far as we can, and that we had better step forward and assume certain obligations in the interest of the world and in the interest of mankind, because there is a utilitarian reason for it—we are likely to be drawn in ourselves. Therefore we ought to depart from the policy of isolation that heretofore has served us so well, because we are a strong nation. We must bear our share of the responsibilities of the moment, and we must help along the world, and incidentally help along ourselves, for I believe, even if you count on it from a selfish standpoint, in the long run it will be a better policy.

It is objected that we only propose to include the

more powerful nations. We'll gladly include them all. But we don't propose to have the constitution of our court complicated by a demand for equal representation of the many smaller nations. We believe that when we have a League of larger powers, the smaller powers will be glad to come in and enjoy the protection that the League will afford against the unjust aggression of the strong against the weak.

It is suggested that we invite a conference of neutral nations to bring about measures for present peace and to formulate demands as to the protection of neutral rights. This may be a good plan, but, as Kipling says, that is another story, and you have got to get people from some other street to organize that movement.

Now we are modest in our hopes, but that is no reason for thinking that we cannot accomplish what we recommend. On the contrary, we think it is a reason for greater hope that what we say may be practical.

We are very grateful to the committee who have organized this reception and tendered this dinner. We sought Independence Hall and Philadelphia as our meeting place, because we had much interest in the cause we are promoting, and much confidence in the practical utility of our proposals, and we knew that in this city and hall, where our nation was born, we could fix country-wide public attention on our discussion and recommendation.

President A. LAWRENCE LOWELL

OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

MR. MAYOR, Ladies and Gentlemen: We are no Senate of the United States. We have no authority to ordain anything. We are merely here, within the rights of the citizens of any true republic, to express

our opinions, to make suggestions, and, if we please, to make them so loud that they will be considered, and, if they have any merit, that they may ultimately find adoption. We are not here to express general aspirations for peace. The time for that has passed. Virtually the whole American nation, without exception, yearns for a period of everlasting peace. But Utopia is a long way off, and what we are attempting to do is merely to make a practical suggestion which may bring us an inch nearer to that far-off goal.

Let me take up the items upon the call for this conference. The first is that the United States should be a member of any League of Peace which we advocate. Some people have said that the United States has nothing to do with the quarrels of Europe, that the Monroe Doctrine involves that, and that we must not take on our shoulders any part of the responsibility for the peace of the world. To that I answer that, if it be true, then our gathering here is not only futile, but it is an impertinence. For us to meet together and advise the nations of Europe what they had better do, but which we think we had better not take a part in, is, to say the least, injudicious, and we had better stop now and go home. The Monroe Doctrine was invented at a time when the ocean took nearly a month to traverse. The ocean has sunk to a lake. In the next generation it will have sunk to a river. We are on the shores of Europe or drawing closer and closer to those shores all the time. If, therefore, we cannot cast off our responsibility for what goes on, if what goes on deeply affects our interests, it is absolutely necessary for us to be a part of any League that we think the great nations of the world ought to make.

Now the provisions, as stated in this tentative draft, are that all the great nations of the world should agree to submit to arbitration—that is, to

lay before a court—any justiciable disputes that they may have, and by justiciable disputes we mean those that can be determined on ascertained grounds of law and equity; in other words, ascertained grounds of justice. But, after all, the great part of the disputes which cause wars among peoples are not justiciable. They are not questions which can be settled on strict rules of justice. They are questions of interests, questions of policy, questions which often go deeper than those things which depend upon the rules and laws of justice; and it is these also that must be submitted—submitted in this case not to a tribunal, but to a Council of Conciliation, which will attempt to bring the parties together. And, mark you, we have not said that they must accept the decision of the tribunal, or that they must conform to the recommendations of the Council of Conciliation, and that because it is better to take one step firmly which can be enforced, than to take further steps which can not be enforced. There are quarrels so deep that no conciliation is likely, at the present stage of the world, to heal them. But we never know whether those quarrels do go so deep until they have been threshed out and made public. The contention is that before nations resort to arms, they shall plead their cause openly, by means of a public hearing, before as nearly as may be an impartial tribunal, or impartial Council of Conciliation, and that they shall not draw the sword until that body has had a chance to listen to what they have to say and to render its opinion thereon. A period of a year is commonly stated to give plenty of time for the court to act and for the nations to cool down.

Now we come to the third point, which is the vital suggestion of the program, and that relates to the enforcement of the preceding provisions.

The difficulty that we have found with arbitration is this, that nations are very ready to arbitrate those things which they do not take seriously enough to care to fight about, and in that way arbitration has been extremely successful. It has not only settled disputes according to justice, which would not have led to war, and disputes which might have been unjustly settled by a lesser nation's fear of the power of the greater, but it has also removed causes of friction which might, in time, have gone into the great balance of feeling which provokes war. But, after all, there is something lying beyond that. There are disputes on which nations would go to war at once, and those wars we wish to prevent if possible. The difficulty has been so far that we have had a court, but have had no sheriff. We have had a tribunal, but have had no police. We are very much in the position of the frontier settlement, where men are shooting at one another at sight over games of cards or the stealing of a horse. And what is done? They organize themselves into a vigilance committee to prevent outbreaks and breaches of the peace. This every frontier settlement without a policeman has found it necessary to do. There must be some power to enforce a submission to arbitration. There must be some power which will say to a nation that wishes to draw the sword: "No, your sword must remain in its scabbard until you two have had a fair hearing, until public opinion has had a chance to form, until your own public and the public in other nations has had a chance to make up its mind whether this matter is really worth fighting about." In most cases the fight, if so postponed, would not occur. It would not occur because when men think over war for a year beforehand, they begin to realize what it means. As soon as you declare war, the nation is of necessity

afire with emotion. No thought can be taken of anything. But if you say beforehand: "A year hence we shall go to war," people begin to talk it over. There gets to be the expression of dissent among the people, which can not be expressed if a war is suddenly snapped upon them. We know very well that in every nation now at war there have been parties that did not want to go to war, and, in those nations which have held off, those parties have found some expression. In those that went in at the outset, they found no expression whatever. What we are aiming at, therefore, is to delay war for a year, during which the cause can be pleaded before the bar of the public and the bar of a tribunal.

Now how are we to procure that year of delay? Our suggestion is that the countries should band themselves together by a solemn league and covenant that they will jointly and severally enforce by arms peace upon any one who breaks the peace. We do not abolish war. We can not abolish war. Let us look at the history of the time before Magna Charta. What happened then? The royal courts came in. Did the royal courts abolish private war between barons? No. They could not do that at once. What was the first step that they undertook? They said that two men should not resort to arms and fight until the case had been brought before the court, argued and stated in proper form, and then, by the leave of the court, they might fight. That was called the trial by battle. It was the first step. It had the effect of preventing, one can hardly say what proportion, but an enormous proportion of the private fights that would otherwise have taken place. And it prevented a baron from bringing in all his neighbors to take part with him. He had to fight it out single-handed with the baron on the

other side. That was a step forward. That was the first step in civilization from the Dark Ages into the more orderly period of the Middle Ages. And that is the step which we find it necessary to take to-day.

Now it has been suggested that we might resort to other methods than banding the nations together with an agreement that they would by force of arms attack any nation that violated the peace with another before submitting its case to arbitration. It has been suggested that, instead of agreeing to go to war, they should agree to consult as to what should be done. When a policeman sees a fight going on in the street, does he say: "I will notify the City Council, that they may consider what shall be done?" When he sees a burglar proposing to enter a house, does he call together a number of people on the street to consult about what had better be done? Would that suppress burglary? Not only must you have a policeman, but your policeman must be armed. But, it is said, then you are encouraging bloodshed. Not at all. The crimes that are prevented by the policeman are infinite in number compared with the cases where he resorts to bloodshed to prevent them. The certainty that all the great nations of the world would attack any one which broke the peace with another would be enough to prevent that breach of the peace. If, on the other hand, the nation merely knew that the others would consult together as to what would be done, that nation would know very well that the result of the consultation would be that they would do nothing, that they would merely talk and express opinions and, as it were, be like a policeman who says to the burglar: "Public opinion does not approve of your entering that house. The enlightened sentiment of the community is averse to it. I will go and con-

sult others as to what had better be done." Oh, no. If we are practical people, thinking of a practical end, what we need is, as I say, the sheriff and the *posse comitatus*. We need an absolute enforcement. We need that every nation shall know that, if it makes a breach of the peace before submitting its case to the tribunal, it will mean war with the whole world—and that war will never occur. The fact that intervention is certain to occur is enough. If you could fully persuade any large nation that war declared under those conditions would mean at once a war with the whole world, you would have attained your object of perpetual peace.

Your difficulty is merely this, that, of course, your system may break down. It may be that one half of the nations of the world are anxious at the same time to go to war with the other half, and that there is no outstanding force that can be brought against them. That is possible. We can not attempt to prevent by any machinery a case of that kind. But that kind of a case is extremely remote. All that we hope to do is to reduce, and to reduce so far as possible, the danger and the probability of war, and, mind you, every war that you prevent tends, by civilizing man, to prevent the next one. Every approach that we can make to an actual prevention of war, each case where it can be made obvious that a nation would have gone to war with its neighbor if it had not been for such a League of Peace, discourages every other nation from trying it, and that can be brought about only in case the certainty of the result is such as to act as an absolute deterrent.

Now the last point upon the program is that the League should try to work out more fully codes of international law and principles of international justice. That, of course, is essential as a step forward. When you have prevented war, you must

go forward and make people realize that war does not occur, because justice took its place. You must build up a belief, a feeling, a confidence in justice, and, when you have done that, you are at least on the path toward that Utopia that we all long for.

The Hon. OSCAR S. STRAUS

MEMBER PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION
AT THE HAGUE

WE HAVE assembled here at a time and in consonance with the spirit and meaning of three epoch-making anniversaries in the onward march of civil liberty,—events which have materially influenced and shaped the destinies of the people of the old world as well as the new. The Magna Charta, Bunker Hill, and Waterloo, each in their turn served to curb the prerogatives of rulers, the power of might and to extend and safeguard the rights of the people.

The purpose and time of this conference accentuates a reversal of the old and discredited standards and axiom that “in peace prepare for war,” for we have assembled in the midst of war to prepare for peace, believing that under the majesty and compelling power of the law will be found the surest guaranty for permanent peace. While righteousness exalteth a nation, history and the present war give uncontrovertible proof that righteousness will not protect a nation unless other nations are likewise exalted by righteousness. When that time arrives we will have reached the millennium, which from present indication is so distant as to justify a search for ways and means that will serve the purpose of the world in the intervening time.

It is a fact which we would deceive ourselves by failing to recognize, that fundamental changes in the progress of mankind have rarely if ever been

possible save by war and as a sequel of war. History of nations, from Armageddon to the invasion of Belgium, teaches that war will not be banished until the leading and more powerful nations become civilized enough to create an organization that can not only induce, but can force resort to other means and impose fundamental changes without resort to war. But—why not war? Because history and the experience of mankind teach that the greatest curse of war is that it settles most international differences by the force of might, and not by the arbitrament of right, and when so settled it will in the future as in the past continue to breed war. Because we believe in pity for the widow and the orphans, we must seek a higher patriotism and a broader nationalism which will no longer teach that the only path of the patriot to Heaven must lead through the bloody trenches of Hell.

Three distinct methods in the past fifteen centuries for maintaining peace in Europe have successively been tried, and broken down. First, the dominance of a single state whose fiat was law, which culminated in the tragedy of the fall of the Roman Empire under the pikes and battle axes of the barbarian hordes. The Second, the result of the Thirty Years War, and the Treaty of Westphalia, from which the system of the Balance of Power had its rise. This developed together with the system known as the Concert of European Powers in successive stages of aggression, whose pathway is strewn with the wreck of empires. Then we arrive at the infuriated heroism of the Napoleonic period. Lastly, we reach the stage following the Congress of Berlin which developed in the grouping of European States into opposing camps of dual and triple alliances and ententes, of which the far flung battle lines in which two-thirds of the world

are now arrayed are the tragic proof of its awful breakdown.

The purpose and object of the Conference which will fittingly assemble in Independence Hall, the cradle of America's freedom, is to discuss and consider proposals for reconstructing a new international freedom under the majesty of righteousness and law, supported not by the power of a single state or a group of states but the compelling power of all the confederated states.

If the nations are to rise out from the extreme suffering of the present war to supreme wisdom, guided by the lesson of their appalling sacrifices, they must reconstruct their international relationship upon new and broader foundations resting upon new and higher moral standards,—standards which will place behind the *right* of each state the *might* of all states composing the league of states. Just as the barons of England wrested from absolutism and militarism the right to establish justice under courts and jury, so must the people of the civilized world wrest from nationalism a Magna Charta of internationalism predicated not as now upon each nation's individual capacity for war but upon a mightier power, the collective power and capacity of the confederated nations for peace.

To accomplish this high purpose let the nations draw the lesson which our hundred years of peace with Great Britain teaches,—a peace not made after exhaustion by an all-conquering victor, exacting humiliating and revengeful terms from a vanquished foe, but in the midst of war in a spirit of mutual concession, leaving outstanding differences to be adjusted by boards of conciliation and by courts of arbitration. Guided doubtless by that spirit the President in his recent note to Germany, while firmly upholding the law of nations, the rights of

humanity and of neutrality, instead of an ultimatum, instead of closing the door to peace, he has with masterly wisdom and skill lifted the latch on the door of mediation for the combating nations. In doing so, in the true spirit of humanity, he has coordinated our nation's rights and justified grievances to the welfare of the world in arms so as to hasten the day of peace.

The Hon. GEORGE GRAY

MEMBER PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION AT
THE HAGUE

MR. CHAIRMAN, Ladies and Gentlemen: I am very glad to be here to-night—because I rejoice to see this great meeting of men and women, who, I believe, represent the men and women of this country united in forwarding the great cause of peace throughout the world.

It is very easy to talk about peace, and we all subscribe to what has been said, or is likely to be said, in favor of a propaganda of peace. But when it comes to doing something practical, to making a real forward step in bringing about peace among the nations of the earth, it requires very much thought and very much action before any achievement can be made. I believe, though, that the movement commenced by this League of Peace will vindicate the thought and purpose of the American people to resist the great tide of savagery and lawlessness that seems now to threaten to engulf the whole world. Our purpose here to-night is to propose a way to make that resistance effective, so that this great peace-loving nation may devote itself to upholding the standards of civilization, peace and good-will throughout the earth.

It is perfectly obvious that nothing can be done to this end unless out of the confusion of individual

utterances a true, high note can be sounded, voicing the dominant thought and intelligence of the American people. We are all loyal to the traditions of our country and proud of our leadership in the cause of peace. This leadership is attested by the more than sixty arbitration treaties that have been proposed and consummated by the United States with the nations of the world. Unembarrassed as we are by dynastic ambitions and breathing an air free from the baleful poison of militarism, we have been enabled to serve the cause of humanity by our example, and to preach a new gospel, not of hate, but of friendliness and good-will to all the nations of the world.

This is not the mere complacency of the Fourth of July spirit, but a sober realization of the great opportunities that an undeveloped continent presented to the brave and liberty-loving men who laid so broad and deep the foundations of our institutions on these western shores of the Atlantic. From the seed then planted has grown this great Republic, and an Americanism which, whatever its shortcomings, is instinct with the love of justice, peace and ordered liberty. We must not be other than true to our past, nor forget the duties that that past imposes upon us.

We cannot abdicate our position of leadership in the cause of peace among the nations, and our courage must rise with the dangers that confront us. We cannot sit as silent and indifferent spectators in the world's great amphitheatre, and view the enactment of the bloodiest drama in all history, and not raise our voice in protest against its unspeakable and causeless horrors.

As I understand the purpose of this League of Peace, its efforts are to be directed to making itself an efficient coadjutor in concentrating the public opinion of this country, in mobilizing it, so to speak,

and causing it to be heard with respect by the warring nations of Europe,

Our President has placed his country upon the unassailable ground of law and humanity, and there we can stand unshaken and unshakable in his support. Some day the time may come, and we all fervently pray that it may soon come, when he can offer, as the spokesman of the people, a suggestion that may find lodgment in the mind and heart of the peoples of the world. This voice, when spoken, must be the voice of a virile people, who, with no selfish aims to subserve and with no purpose of aggression or aggrandizement, stand for law and justice and the broad humanities that underlie our civilization.

We must be ready to defend, if needs be, the position we have taken, and prepare ourselves, not *for* war, but, as has been happily said by someone, *against* war. There is nothing inconsistent with our character as a peace-loving nation, in so strengthening our power that perforce we will be listened to when we speak, at the right time, at the right moment, the word that shall attract the attention of the whole world. In order that we may do this, I venture to say that it is our duty so to strengthen the sea power of this nation that our navy may protect everywhere the commerce that traverses the high seas and the ocean paths that are free to all neutral nations; that we shall so strengthen our little Army—so moderately strengthen it—that it may serve as the nucleus upon which the citizen soldiery of the States may be built into an effective and efficient army of defense. These, I believe, are all sentiments which are in the hearts of the American people when they hold up the olive branch of peace to the nations of the world.

Mr. HAMILTON HOLT

EDITOR, THE INDEPENDENT

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Three questions are now before the friends of peace. First, how can we keep out of the war? Second, how can the war be stopped? Third, how can all war be stopped? It is the purpose of the conference that is to convene at Independence Hall to-morrow to discuss this third question.

In 1795, in his famous essay, "Perpetual Peace," the great German philosopher, Emmanuel Kant, said that we never can have universal peace until the world is politically organized, and that it will not be possible to organize the world politically until the peoples and not the kings rule. And he added that we must rid our hearts of the feeling of hatred and hostility to the stranger within our gates and to the neighbor across our border.

If this be the true philosophy of peace—and it seems to me the most fundamental thing I have ever read on the peace movement—then, when the Great War is over, and the stricken, sobered peoples set about to rear a new civilization on the ashes of the old, they will have to do at least three things: they will have to extend democracy everywhere—even here in the United States of America. They will have to instill within themselves a spirit of hospitality and good-will towards other peoples; and they will have to create the international machinery for the doing of the international business. They will have to organize the world politically.

The bringing about of the spirit of hospitality towards other peoples, the extension of democracy, if it is brought about at all, must be done within the nations; but the political organization of the world will not be done within the nations, but by joint action of the nations. And there, and there only, can

the United States exert any influence in the peace movement, beyond its own borders.

The problem, then, of our conference is, how to organize the world politically for peace, and the outcome of peace, which is the limitation of armaments.

Let me first take up the question of the limitation of armaments. During the last ten years a great fight has been waged between the pacifists and the militarists, over the question of armaments. The militarists claim that armaments are our ultimate protection from annihilation. The pacifists say that armaments lead directly to war, and if we prepare for a thing we get what we prepare for, and that this war would never have happened if some nations had not been prepared for it.

Now the truth is that both of these contentions are perfectly correct. Armaments do protect us when we are in trouble, and, on the other hand, they are one of the causes—perhaps the chief cause—that bring us into trouble. How can we solve this paradox? How can we have the protection that armaments afford and at the same time disarm? Because if we cannot do this, we must admit that it is a law of nature that war is to consume all the fruits of progress.

Before we can understand this question clearly, we must recognize the threefold function of force in international relations. First there is the force of international police, which is almost wholly good. An international police by might enthrones reason. The second kind of force is aggression, which is almost always bad. It is an attempt to impose the will of the aggressor on someone else, who had no part in helping to decide as to whether the cause was just or not. Any judge, any lawyer, will offer convincing arguments that this is the height of immorality. The third use of force is defense. It is justifiable as long as offence exists. Defense is simply

the neutralization of offense. The problem of the peacemovement is therefore how to get rid of the force of aggression and replace it with the force of international police. Defense of course will automatically cease when offense ceases.

How can this be done? I know of but three ways. The London *Spectator* suggested one a few weeks ago. It said, let a nation or group of nations disarm all the other nations by force and then disarm itself. That idea, of course, is too preposterous to discuss. Another way to limit armaments would be to call a conference of the nations and to limit armaments by joint agreement. That, however, I believe to be impossible, because there are too many medieval-minded nations in existence.

There is just one other way. It may be that here and now there are enough—and there must be enough—nations who are ready to disarm, or to limit their armaments, in advance of the others. How can they do it, with safety to themselves? Let them form a league of peace, based on the principle of the United States between members of the league and on the principle of England as to the relation of members of the league to outside nations. Let me explain. When our forefathers united over a hundred years ago to create the United States of America the State of New York and the State of Virginia each had its separate navy. But, upon joining the Union, they abolished their separate navies, and relinquished their right to intervene by force in interstate affairs. In return, they were guaranteed home rule and local autonomy by the combined power of the other States. The United States is founded, not on the principle of home rule—that is the basis upon which the States are built—but on the principle of sacrifice, on the duty of sovereigns to surrender a part of their sovereignty whenever the general welfare demands it.

The taxes that New York and Virginia paid into the Federal treasury for the protection which they received from the Federal Army and Navy, were less than the amount of taxes they had previously paid into their own State treasuries, to maintain their own military forces, before the Union was established. In other words, New York and Virginia, by joining our Union, reduced their armaments. Now let the nations of the League reduce their armaments, in a similar way. How? Our forefathers created international institutions for the carrying on of the international business—a Supreme Court, a Congress, an Executive—and then they reduced their armaments down to the point of safety, where the Federal force was great enough to protect the League from being smashed from within or from without. Now let the League of nations do the same thing. Let them form a court, a council of conciliation, and a legislature, and put force behind them, and then and then only can they afford to reduce down to the point of safety. And what is the point of safety? Where the forces of the League are greater than those of any nation that is likely to be brought against it. That is the principle of England. England has a navy equal to any two navies likely to come against it. Let the League of Peace be joined together, therefore, on the basis of the United States, with courts, parliaments, executives and limitation of armaments, and keep a force greater than that of any nation outside, for use against those nations that will not forswear force.

Now suppose a League of Peace is established. Suppose the majority of the great powers—all the great powers, if we can get them—should join such a League. The small powers would have to come in for protection. Suppose the great powers, or the majority of them, had a standing army, we will say,

of 2,000,000 men. Suppose Russia stays outside of the League and has a standing army of a million men. The League, even if they thought that Russia was likely to attack it, could reduce its force down to a million and a quarter, or a million and a half, and still protect itself against Russia. But what will be happening in the meantime in Russia? Will not the liberals notice that the members of the League are enjoying greater protection for less taxes and are attempting all sorts of co-operative experiments, perhaps even free trade, as did our States under our constitution? They will forthwith begin to bring pressure to bear upon the Russian Government, until finally Russia will apply for membership in the League. Then, when Russia enters, there can be a second pro rata reduction of the forces of the League down to the size of the next great nation outside, and, when that nation comes in, there will be another pro rata reduction, and so on down and down until finally a mere international police maintains the peace of the earth, under a Federal form of government, with legislative, judicial and executive branches.

This is the theory of the League of Peace. Will it be brought about when this war is over? No human being knows. But I believe the theory is sound.

Let me say, please, in conclusion, that it seems to me to be the destiny of the United States to lead in this movement. The United States is the world in miniature. The United States is a demonstration that all the peoples of the earth can live in peace under one form of government, and its chief value to civilization is the demonstration of what this form of government is. The United States itself is the greatest League of Peace known to history. But, as our forefathers, when they formed our first

confederation with its Continental Congress and its Continental Court, found it hopelessly inadequate for their needs, and had to develop it into the more perfect union of our present constitution, so, even when we get our League of Peace, it will not be perfect until we go on developing it to the point where the legislature has power to make international law, the court has jurisdiction over international disputes, and the executive has power to carry out the decrees of the courts and conferences. Then we shall have, in very truth, that final world government which the historian Freeman has said, when it comes into existence, will constitute "the most finished and the most artificial production of political ingenuity."

THE OBLIGATION TO KEEP THE PEACE

By The Honorable THEODORE MARBURG

FORMER UNITED STATES MINISTER TO BELGIUM

THE failure of existing institutions to prevent war points to the need of sanction. All the present Hague institutions for the settlement of international disputes are voluntary. Nations may or may not resort to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, to the International Commission of Inquiry, to Mediation and Good Offices, according as they see fit.

Many men formerly satisfied with these voluntary institutions now believe that the element of obligation must be added. It is only a question of how far they are willing to go. Shall we, through the united action of the nations, forbid war, or should we simply compel disputants to resort to institutions already in existence or hereafter to be set up in the honest endeavor to compose their quarrels before they are allowed to make the appeal to arms?

On the threshold of the inquiry we are met by the consciousness that the leagues of the past have not had signal success either as instruments of justice or as preventives of war. The recurrent meetings of the Quadruple Alliance were on the whole fruitless. The Holy Alliance, far from fulfilling its purpose of promoting the Christian religion, occupied itself with supporting royal authority, notably in Naples (1821) and Hungary (1849), and in one instance, with France as its mandatory, threw down liberal institutions (Spain, 1823), which the country had wrung from its reluctant monarch, and restored despotism.

The Concert of Europe has done some creditable things. It smashed the Turkish fleet at Navarino in 1827 and liberated Greece. It has mitigated the unhappy lot of the Armenians in Turkey. It has prevented more than one Balkan war. But how many failures are registered against it and what disaster has overtaken it now! To the existence of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, formed ostensibly for peace, the very extent of the present cataclysm is traceable.

In planning a new league manifestly a first duty is to ascertain why the leagues of the past have failed. And our search need not carry us far afield.

We are confronted at once with the fact that each of these leagues was composed of a small number of powers, so small as to permit of collusion to prey upon nations outside the league, or of the wilful triumph of selfish interests to the injury both of its other members and of the world at large.

Within the state the cause of justice is advanced under a democratic regime by the play of opposing interests, the interests of one individual against the interests of another individual, of one class against another class, and by the united thinking of the

many. This leads to the conclusion that if we can set up a league which shall embrace all the progressive nations, big and little, we may look for wise and just action from it. But which are the progressive nations? To measure progress in terms of numbers—growth of population, yards of cotton, or pounds of steel—is to set up a false standard. True progress lies in the growth of the spiritual and intellectual forces, of things other than the material, above all, in growth of justice; justice of man to man, justice of employer to employee, justice written in the law, justice interpreted by the court, justice of the state toward its people, and justice of nation to nation. No nation which fails habitually to protect the life, liberty and property of the people within its own borders can bring strength to the league. Persistent injustice within a state is almost certain to involve that state sooner or later in foreign war even though it escape civil war. Injustice on the part of a league will involve the league in war, precisely as illegal and inhuman practises in the conduct of war tend to draw into the conflict an ever wider circle of nations. Justice is the growing purpose of the world. War is to be condemned principally because it is a source of such wholesale injustice. Justice, rather than the suppression of war, is the real end to be sought. War, with all its horrors, is preferable to gross and protracted and widespread injustice.

The progressive nations, then, may be said to be those in which there exists a measure of good laws fairly well administered.

Specifically, this would give to the league the eight great powers—including the United States—the secondary powers of Europe, and the "A B C" countries of South America. In this group we find three great peoples with common political aspira-

tions, namely, those of Great Britain, France and the United States, peoples which no longer regard democracy as a passing phase of political experiment, but as a permanent fact of politics. We find in it two powerful nations, Great Britain and the United States, which may be said to be satisfied territorially. We find, moreover, a group of smaller nations with no disturbing ambitions.

It is believed that if such a league could be formed substantial justice would emerge from its united action just as under the Federal Government substantial justice results to the forty-eight states, originally sovereign entities, now composing the American Union. And unless justice results the league can not endure. Unless justice results we do not want it.

Now, a desirable plan would embrace such a broad league, a league which should not itself attempt to pronounce upon international disputes but would refer the disputants to certain institutions for the settlement of controversies and insist that they may not resort to war.

In such a project we find four progressive stages:

First Stage. Institutions such as we now have, supplemented by a true court of justice, all of which institutions shall be purely voluntary or facultative.

Second Stage. The element of obligation added in so far as the nations shall bind themselves to resort to these institutions.

Third Stage. The further addition of an agreement to have the league act as an international grand jury to hale the nation law-breaker into court and to use force to bring it there if recalcitrant.

Fourth Stage. The final addition of an agreement to use force, if need be, to execute the award of the tribunal.

Now, how much of this "desirable" plan is a "realizable" project?

The difficulty that faces us with regard to the last two steps is the reluctance of nations to make the surrender of sovereignty and independence which they involve. It means that the signatories bind themselves to make war, under certain conditions, in the common interest. Can the United States Senate be brought to such a view of its duty to mankind? The last step, that of enforcing the award, involves likewise the danger of oppression unless the league charged with such a duty should embrace all or nearly all of the progressive nations. On the other hand, the demand that controversies be referred to a tribunal and that the decision of such tribunal be awaited before making war involves no danger of oppression. It is a reasonable demand. A project which included bringing a nation into the presence of a tribunal but made no attempt to execute the award could therefore be safely instituted by a league embracing all, or nearly all, of the great powers without awaiting the adherence of the secondary powers, though the presence of the latter would make the league all the stronger.

As the nation which consented so to refer its disputes to a tribunal would not be obliged either by its own promise or by the will of the league to observe the award, the proceedings would be much in the nature of a mere inquiry. But since publicity tends to correct not only illegal practices but unjust ones, too, and does it without resort to a court of law or even to a tribunal of arbitration, it is felt that in the majority of cases the controversy would be stilled by investigation alone.

It will be observed that the plan here proposed moves forward the present practice in two particulars, namely, in binding the signatories to resort to international institutions for the settlement of con-

troversies before making war and in compelling them so to do if recalcitrant.

This is as far as some men of wide practical experience are willing to go. They are unwilling, for example, as part of a realizable plan, to take the fourth step, namely, bind the league to enforce the award.

Moreover, it is felt that out of the more modest project the greater project may grow, that if nations acquire the habit of submitting their controversies to a tribunal, presently the world will become impatient of failure to respect an award made under such conditions.

The balance-of-power theory, which has so long governed European politics, would fall before the security promised by a league, in fact must fall if the league is to operate successfully. That theory presupposes rival nations or groups of nations whose potential strength and whose influence, therefore, balance each other. This can only lead to the formation of a group outside the league sufficiently strong to oppose the will of the league. That spells war.

PROFESSOR JOHN BATES CLARK

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

MR. PRESIDENT and Members of the Conference: The brief paper which I have prepared has to do with something in the recent trend of events, which, as I think, is working powerfully, and even decisively, in favor of a League of Peace.

The war has converted the belligerent nations to that kind of pacifism which consists in a grim determination that the present Armageddon shall never be repeated, however long it may be necessary to fight in order to ensure this outcome. Short of a

conquest of Europe by one power there is only one means by which a lasting peace can be secured and that is by such a League of Nations as we have assembled to discuss. We are confronted, however, by the fact that, of the various plans for such a league, ranging from a mere extension of treaties of arbitration and conciliation to a complete world state with a central government, an army and navy, only the very modest plans seem to many persons to be practicable and those which aim to accomplish the larger things seem utopian. If the creation of the League depended entirely on the conscious efforts of peace-loving men, this would be the correct view. The first question to be answered is what kind of union *can* be secured? and in the face of all the misgivings which exist I wish to express the audacious opinion that something having the characteristics of a very effective league is rapidly evolving, that it will have ample force at its command and that, at the close of the war, it will probably require only a minor modification to enable it to prevent, for an indefinite time, the recurrence of a great war on the Continent of Europe. The very efficiency of the union and the force it will be able in case of necessity to use will make it more probable than less probable that peoples generally will favor it and that governments will accept it. It is an ambitious league and not a modest one which natural forces are bringing for the first time within reach.

It is not necessary to create a league of peace *de novo* and without reference to combinations which now exist. Two great leagues have been formed, each embracing powerful states and each so firmly held together that it acts toward the outer world much as a single great empire would do. Since they are now waging against each other the greatest

war in history, the conclusion is much too lightly reached that such unions are, *by their very nature*, war-breeders. Defensive unions, however, are in line with the whole trend of political evolution. Great states, created by combining smaller ones, are in the order of the day, and they, as well as mere federations, make far more strongly for peace than for warfare. Each consolidated state stops a multitude of local conflicts and the peace between it and its great neighbors lasts much longer than does that between warring districts which later unite in such states. If peace shall ever become universal, it will do so by establishing itself within larger and larger areas till it shall end by embracing the world. It is an even century since a war akin to this one was waging in Europe, and if the principle of union shall be made to produce its natural effect, it may perhaps be a series of centuries before there is another. To utilize the great natural forces leading to this result is in the power of the men of to-day.

Let us assume as a fact, what is at all events possible, and by most persons is regarded as probable, namely, that the present war has been ended while both the Entente and the Alliance continue to be strong and that in everything political they are the powers which must first be reckoned with. Let us assume that, in each of them, the constituent countries are held firmly together because no single country can think of surrendering the protection which union affords. Outside of the Entente, France would be helpless against an attack by Germany and outside of the Alliance, Austria would be helpless against one by Italy and Russia. Any country standing alone would have a precarious hold on its territory and its freedom.

The chief dangers that threaten a great league

spring from within, while those that threaten a small league are from without. A union of all Europe would be entirely immune against foreign attack and, *for that very reason*, would be in great danger of being disrupted and plunged into something like civil war. Especially would this be true while the suspicions and enmities engendered by the present conflict were still continuing. Such a union as the Alliance and the Entente, each of which has a great power now arrayed against it, is held together much more firmly. The bond that unites its members is the imperative need of mutual protection. If, as we have supposed, the war has ended neither in a draw nor in a sweeping victory for one side—if the unsuccessful league has kept most of its territories and its fighting strength—the bond that unites each union will be of the strongest. The most vital of interests will prevent the constituent states from falling apart.

This situation will throw an enormous power into the hands of the neutral countries. Their adherence to one of the unions will be of immense importance to it. By joining either of them they might cause it to preponderate over its rival; and by joining the victorious one they would make it safe against any attack and able, if it were disposed to do so, to guarantee the peace of Europe. For the small states themselves a defensive combination with larger ones is of even greater importance, and in all of them the opinion is growing that, in their case, "liberty and union are one and inseparable." For their own ends it is becoming indispensable to secure, by one means or another, the guaranty of their territory and their independence which only a great league can make effective. Their actual membership in such a league would probably cause it to become, if it were not already, a truly democratic union of nations, respect-

ing the rights of great and small, and fully committed to a just and peaceful policy.

In order to be a nucleus of such a commonwealth a league should, if possible, already contain enough great states to prevent any one from dominating the others. There should be a certain balance of power among its leading members but, if possible, it should contain at the outset a number of the smaller states and, as a group, it should be so free from aggressive designs as to merit the confidence of states not as yet in any combination. Since the Entente now virtually includes five great states and four small ones, and may soon be joined by others, it already has important qualifications for becoming such a league of peace as we are suggesting—a commonwealth of nations powerful enough to preserve peace and vitally interested in doing it. We may use it, therefore, as the most available illustration of what is possible in a union of this kind.

The original purpose of each of the two leagues now existing was protective. Each of them aimed primarily to secure its members against attacks by other powers, and this security, which all the present members continue to need, is what the small neutral countries are also compelled to look for. What they must demand of any combination which they are asked to join is, above all else, protection.

Now the more promising plans for new leagues of peace which have been suggested contain no provision for protecting their members from attacks by nations outside of their circle. They content themselves with preventing warfare between the members. On the other hand, the present militant combinations have no formal and constitutional machinery for settling internal disputes. A true commonwealth of nations needs to be assured against both dangers and its constitution, therefore, will need to contain the

best provisions that it is humanly possible to devise both for settling peacefully all internal disputes and for preventing or repelling attacks by other states. This is saying that an enlarged Entente, besides protecting its members, as it is now fighting desperately to do, will need to guard itself against the perils that necessarily beset large leagues, those, namely, that originate from within. The worst fate that could befall it would be disruption. The institutions of the Hague will be for it well nigh a *sine qua non* of success, and there must be measures for compelling a resort to them in disputes between members of the league and in those arising between any of them and states outside of it. Such provisions as have been outlined in the brief and admirable plan which has been submitted to the members of this Conference will be imperatively needed in one that may evolve out of one of the existing leagues, *but in any case the protective function of the existing militant unions must continue to be performed*. In order to appeal to the nations strongly enough to be created at all—in order to be efficient enough to seem to the nations worth creating—a League of Peace must fulfill the functions of the best of the new leagues thus far suggested and must add to them the protective function of the leagues which now exist. There must be a potential militancy in its composition, though it will probably remain as nearly latent as it is in any well policed city. Pacifism judicial plus pacifism protective equals pacifism successful and enduring. Such is one of the major equations of human destiny and it is written so deeply in the laws of nature that nothing which governments themselves could do would materially change it.

If a new league shall ever be formed without affording protection against external attacks, it will be indispensable that the Entente and the Alliance should

continue. It would be vain to ask their constituent countries to dissolve them and trust to a new league that would leave each of them to fight its own battles. How secure would France or Italy be under such a condition? If the states now in the Entente should join such a new and non-resistant league, their own present combination would remain and would become a union within a union—a compact defensive body within a loosely organized combination for promoting the friendly settlement of disputes. This is entirely possible. We can have our new Union and still utilize the old ones. A new league of many states might conceivably be formed and the Entente might join it bodily and continue to give to its own members the protection which the larger league would not give. The other alternative would be to enlarge the present league and insert in its constitution the needed provisions for peacefully settling all disputes of which a member is a party. Something akin to this is not unlikely spontaneously to occur. The governments in the Entente cannot be unaware of the new force which they would thereby gain.

Whatever may be said of a league so formed, the objection that it is “theoretical” or “utopian” certainly cannot be urged. Neither the Alliance nor the Entente looks particularly utopian. Nine countries are already in one of these combinations and they are jointly fulfilling the highly ambitious function that, in making constitutions for new leagues, few persons are bold enough to require of the members—that of lavishing life and treasure in defending each other. In this respect, the present reality outstrips our former dreams. The leagues that now exist have placed us at a halfway station on the route to the land that we have long seen as in a vision. By the expenditure of more blood and treasure, at a cost of more human agony than figures can measure or

imagination grasp, we have been carried over the more difficult part of the route to the land of permanent peace. If humanity is efficient enough to be worth saving, it should be able to take the steps that remain.

Herein lies the golden opportunity for the neutral states. They have a sense of danger and the protective feature of a league will attract them, though the chance of being involved in a general war will, in itself, repel them. It will probably repel them less than the danger of being conquered by some great state, and both dangers will be at a minimum if the international body that they join is too strong to be attacked and if its spirit, as well as its formal constitution and the interest of its members, hold it in ways of justice. It will be in the power of the neutral countries to act effectively in making it so, since they can consent to join a union only on condition that it shall have this character stamped upon it.

It will be hard indeed for the two leagues now in deadly war with each other *at once* to unite in any single combination. Will the fact that one of them for a time holds aloof be a source of danger? In one essential way it will be a cause of security. It is sadly to be admitted that, in the present moral status of the world, treaties are not bands of steel, and there is danger that they may be broken when they are not buttressed by national interests. Against the danger of disruption a defensive league which does not include all states of Europe may be stronger than one which does so. The treaty that binds such a league together will be powerfully reinforced if all the members have a sense of common danger—a sense of the presence of a foe strong enough to overcome any country singly. Pressure from without means solidarity within and, while enmities are deep and strong, a powerful and hostile nation might im-

part to a league more strength by remaining outside of it than by joining it and bringing its enmities within the circle.

It is because of this fact that I feel justified in asserting with all the emphasis at my command that the complete crushing of one side in this war is not necessary for permanent peace and, indeed, is as far as possible from being favorable for it. It may be necessary that one side should win and that the other side should discover that it cannot by any persistence hope to win; but when so much has been accomplished, a peace will be within reach that will be indefinitely firmer than any that could be gained by the annihilation of one of the two powers now in conflict. If so an abiding peace may be had at a much earlier date than it could if the complete crushing of one power were a necessary basis of it.

In the long run, all Europe should be consolidated. The chance that it will become so by a single step is small, and the best practical beginning of a general union will be furnished by one of the existing leagues, enlarged by the adherence of neutral countries and fortified against the danger of disruption from within by the exposure of any seceding state to the peril of attacks from without. The League may thrive on external hostility until the good time shall come when the desired system of settling international disputes shall be thoroughly established and peace shall prevail by the supremacy of reason. Guarding always the territory and protecting the sovereignty of its members the league will in the end develop mutual interests so important that a new and powerful tie will bind the countries together in addition to the bond furnished by the necessity for defense. That necessity itself will grow less, armaments may then be curtailed and the forces now engaged in mutual destruction may become available for raising in many

ways the level of human life. Under such influences the league should become too powerful to be attacked from without and too indispensable to humanity to be weakened or disrupted from within.

Leaving for others the discussion of the steps which our Government may, at the proper moment, take, I content myself with showing what those natural forces, which are even stronger than governments, have done. They have brought about a condition in which the entire future of the world bids fair to be secure and happy, or imperilled and unhappy, according as some efficient league of peace shall or shall not be created; secondly, that the neutral states will have, at the close of the war, a rare opportunity to aid in the creation of it; and, thirdly, that America, if she remains neutral, can act concurrently with those states and can prepare in advance for such joint action. With the Alliance and the Entente continuing and a league of neutral countries existing the situation will be ripe for creating the type of union that shall have all needed qualities and can give to both continents that lasting peace for the sake of which the countries of Europe are impoverishing and depopulating themselves.

For these reasons I conclude that in the leagues now at war may be found an indispensable element of the league of peace. There is inspiration in this possibility and there is a terrible spur to action in what will ensue if it is not realized—desolated lands under enormous debts with no assurance against a further struggle; neutral lands as well as belligerent ones involved in the competition for larger armies, navies, arsenals, guns and fortifications; the people demanding costly reforms by governments unable to afford them and in peril of revolution if they refuse to do so. Only in the relief from war and its burdens lies the possibility of meeting such needs and giving

to social progress an upward trend. Such is the plain teaching of the pending struggle. It is as though the war demon himself had led humanity to the parting of the roads where the guide boards indicate, on the one side, the long way to the Delectable Mountains and on the other, a short route to the pit. Far reaching beyond all precedent is the choice that humanity must soon make and lands at war and lands at peace must participate in the decision.

Mr. EDWARD A. FILENE

VICE-PRESIDENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

MR. PRESIDENT and Gentlemen: I think this meeting is the high water mark of practical progress in this country toward the goal of that lasting peace for which all the world is hoping. Our progress in this country, if it is to be real and practical, will not come—cannot come—through wishes and hopes and dreams as the machinery, but must come through our Senate and through our President. In order that our Senate and our President shall act, they must have behind them, not only good will, but really organized public opinion.

It is not possible to unite the country, on the whole mass of desirable things, on the whole mass of right, that ultimately we hope some future ages will see.

With three out of the four propositions before this Conference, that of the World Court for justiciable cases, that of the Council of Conciliation for non-justiciable cases, and of some international body that shall make the legislation with which the world court shall deal as international law, we are, and I think the country as a whole is, in accord, and those working along similar lines from the other countries

are also beginning to express themselves as in accord.

As a business man, I am interested in no propositions for more lasting peace unless there is behind them some sanction, some means of enforcement, and the third proposition in this program deals with a method of enforcement, and it says it is to be a military one. Now in the study that I have been able to make, and in my talk and consultation with many men in this country, it has seemed that there was something to be added to that.

In the original article it says: "Third. That the signatory powers shall jointly use their military force to prevent any one of their number from going to war, or committing acts of hostility, against any other of the signatories, before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing." The form which I propose as a substitute—and I may say that this is a formula which certain European co-workers, interested in achieving the same thing as ourselves, have adopted, and we all hope that eventually the European countries will either agree with us or make us agree with them, so that we shall be able to act together upon the third article—the form which I propose to substitute is as follows:

"That the signatory powers shall support, by such concerted measures, diplomatic, economic and military, as in the judgment of the majority may be most effective, any one of their number that is attacked without previous submission of the dispute to judgment or conciliation, as provided in the foregoing."

America has it within her power to organize forces which are greater, perhaps, than battleships and armies. Please do not misunderstand me. I am not suggesting that the world can do without arms. I do not think we can, any more than we can do without the policeman. But, just as within the State

there are many things we use besides the policeman, and before we use the policeman, for the enforcement of the law or the execution of the judgments of the courts, so there are forces that we can use before we employ our armies and our navies. These forces can be summarized in the term "Economic Pressure," by which I mean the commercial and financial boycott of any nation which goes to war without submitting its dispute to judgment or to inquiry, and that boycott could be of a progressive severity. In the first, and what would probably be usually a sufficiently effective stage, the nations forming a league for international law and order would refuse to buy goods from or sell goods to the offending nation. If its offense, however, were a very grievous one, and continued despite the first measures, so that greater pressure were needed, the nations of the League would practically sever all intercourse with it and refuse to enter into financial or commercial transactions, refuse to receive or send its mail, or to clear its ships. And then only, finally, if such measures were ineffective, would military force be resorted to. But my plea is that, in the first instance, economic force is clearly indicated and that military force should be resorted to only if economic pressure should prove ineffective. It is the deterrent effect of organized non-intercourse which would make war less likely, since it would be a terrible penalty to incur, and one more difficult, in a sense, to fight against than military measures. Furthermore, its systematic organization would tend to make any subsequent military action by the League more effective. Many States that, for various reasons, might not be able to co-operate with military force, can co-operate with their economic force, and so render the action against the offending State more effective, and that, in the end, would be more humane.

It is also argued that it is a two-edged weapon, likely to injure ourselves as much as the nation at whom it may be aimed—that, in other words, it is costly. Well, is not all punishment costly? Are judicial systems and our prisons maintained for nothing? And is not war also an instrument which is costly and which injures ourselves? Is not the whole system of peace within the State based on the principle that we are prepared to pay for the prevention of law-breaking? Moreover I would point out that a league like this implies that the coercing members shall outweigh the members to be coerced. It is based on the assumption that the lawbreaker will be in the minority, or will be inferior in strength. In that case a principle like non-intercourse would not weigh so heavily upon the party inflicting the pressure, because the burden would be distributed over more backs.

Another objection is that it will bear with undue hardship upon individuals of special trades and industries. Well, again, so does war. But I think on the whole it would be easier to prevent that special distress in the case of non-intercourse than in the case of war. The experience of the combatants in the present war is particularly enlightening on this point. On the morrow of the declaration of war, many credit institutions in London—and the same thing is true of Berlin—found themselves threatened with what would have been, in the absence of special measures, absolute ruin. But especial measures were taken, and the Government successfully used its power to prevent all the effects of the war falling upon any one class in the community.

A further objection is that in the past embargoes have not been effective, and in support of this the Berlin and Milan Decrees of the Napoleonic Wars are generally cited. But surely this does not take

into account the immense differences in the character and importance of international intercourse at the opening of the nineteenth century and at the opening of the twentieth century. Take a single thing as illustrating it—the amount of mail handled in 1813 and the amount handled in 1913. There was nothing vital in international intercourse one hundred years ago. When it took six weeks at least for Paris to communicate with Washington, the effect of isolating a capital for a few weeks was simply not felt. But the sudden isolation of the capitals of Europe, in August, 1914, compelled every government concerned to take extraordinary and exhaustive measures immediately, by re-organizing their whole commercial and financial life. The effect did not trickle down through weeks or months, as it did a hundred years ago. It was felt, and felt instantaneously and disastrously.

Of course, these forces will need efficient organization, and surely, of all the nations in the world, it is this nation which is most fitted by its circumstances to lead the way in the development of international relations. If this country could, during the course of the war, secure agreements with the nations of South America, and possibly other neutral States, you would then have the nucleus, the first grouping, commanding resources so vast as to carry immense weight with the world at that time.

I believe that the movement toward national agreement in our own country can best be begun by the groups represented at this meeting. I believe that the proposal of economic pressure may form the pivot of such an agreement, for this reason: it is evident that in any international arrangements for the future, we must have some means for compelling observance of them. Many see very great, if not insuperable, difficulties to the creation of an

international police force. Many of the objections raised to that form of compulsion would not be applicable to the one under discussion, and there are very few indeed who would object to the employment of military force, if the preliminary method of economic pressure had been first applied. Thus many difficulties which have stood in the way of unifying national opinion in this matter are surmounted, and the unification of public opinion on this matter is essential to success.

The present situation, in conclusion, compels an attention on the part of our nation to international affairs that it has never before been compelled in any insistent way to give to them. This is evidenced by the present crisis. I think that the proposals that have been presented to us all so well during this meeting can be tested in the crisis that we are facing. The American Government may by its action within the next few days or weeks determine the kind of settlement that Europe will have after the war—a settlement so fundamentally important to the peace and prosperity of the United States. If America stands now for the rights of our citizens on the high seas, she will help to give the world a sound peace, for her rights can only be finally vindicated, first, by a drastic reform of sea law, which means co-operating with other nations in creating a legislative body to frame agreements on such law; second, by a just interpretation of this sea law, which means an international court; and third, by some method of compelling respect for the court's decision, which means finding something better as a way of enforcing international law than taking sides in a war in which both sides may be violating the law. The United States can find that method by properly organizing in advance economic pressure, some form of non-intercourse or international boy-

cott, against a law-breaking nation. For these things we must stand if we would preserve our own respect, our own interests, and those of the civilized world.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON RESOLUTIONS

A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, CHAIRMAN

MR. PRESIDENT and GENTLEMEN: The Committee has considered carefully the suggestions which were submitted to it, and has made a number of changes to meet the suggestions which have been made. I should like to read the report of the Committee, which, I will say, Mr. President, is unanimous, although there were differences of opinion very strongly represented in the Committee, which to some extent resulted in compromises, on which we unanimously agree. I will explain the changes as I read them.

The first of these resolutions, as originally prepared, stated:

It is desirable for the United States to join a league of all the great nations, binding the signatories to the following.

Objection was raised from several quarters, both directly here and indirectly outside, that this looked as if it was to be a combination only of great nations, from which those which were not of the same magnitude should be excluded. That, of course, never was the intention. The "great nations" was put in really, as I remember the original drafting, as a beginning only, but, finding that the expression conveyed the idea that it was to be limited finally to the great nations, we have concluded to leave out the words "all the great," so that it will read: *It is desirable*

for the United States to join a league of nations, binding the signatories to the following, prescribing not at all which the nations shall be, but leaving that to be settled when any such league is formed, our idea being merely to present a general plan, leaving the details to be worked out later.

Then the next clause:

All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiations, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

The words "subject to the limitation of treaties" were introduced to meet Mr. Foulke's objection, which the Committee thought entirely sound. That is the objection that the court might have jurisdiction to hold something as a justiciable question in spite of any treaty provision to the contrary. We had no intention of defining what "justiciable" means in a short statement of objects of this kind, although, of course, "justiciable" ought to be defined carefully in any treaty which should embody such a league.

Then, owing to a fear that there might be some questions, which were justiciable in their nature, but not to be submitted, removed from the tribunal by treaty, and yet which would not for that reason come under the head of non-justiciable questions, we substituted in the second resolution for "all non-justiciable," "all other questions," so that all questions would be covered either before the tribunal or before the Council of Conciliation, so that the second resolution reads:

All other questions arising between the signatories, and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

The crux of the whole matter is, of course, contained in the third article, and there we have attempted to take into account the suggestions that were made to us from the side of the commercial organizations. We feel very strongly that the all-value and essence of the proposition is that any nation that proposes to use force upon another, that proposes to go to war with another, shall know what consequences that action will entail—that it will entail an immediate punishment by all the civilized nations who join the League; that it shall not be followed simply by a conference of powers to decide what shall be done, for we all know very well that a conference of powers does little or nothing, and that the fear of their so doing is slight, but that they shall agree that they will act at once when acts of hostility are committed, or war declared, by one nation upon another. On the other hand, the representatives of the commercial bodies have said to us that they believe that economic pressure could be applied in addition to military pressure, and that it would have a more rapid effect and should be added to the military pressure. We, therefore, agreed unanimously upon this form: "The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces." And then, Mr. President, we have made another change there. We had originally said: "To prevent any one of their number." It looked as if that intended to ask the signatory powers to declare war on a country which was proposing to commit acts of hostility, before she actually committed them, and to go to war to prevent war. Of course, that is not what we meant. What we meant was that, if she committed acts of hostility, the punishment would come. Therefore, we have changed that, so that it reads:

The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

We had one suggestion there which we, on consideration and after considerable doubt, thought it was unwise to accept. It was suggested that we should not only use this force against any member of the League that committed hostilities, but against any nation outside of the League that committed hostilities upon a member of the League. No doubt that would be a desirable thing, but there is one very serious difficulty that one encounters thereby. Suppose at the outset the only countries willing to join this League were the United States, England and France. Leaving it as we are now, that any act committed by one of the signatories upon another shall involve the action of all, it would merely practically amount to a League of Peace between England, France and America, preventing any one of those countries from going to war with another, and it would have no further effect. In so far, it would be beneficial, but would not establish world peace. But, so far as it went, it would have a tendency to prevent war between the nations so signing the same. It would mean that no one of those three could go to war with any other of the three without submitting to arbitration first, subject to the penalty of having the other one join the enemy. It would be a League of Peace among those three. But if we put in the provision, beyond that, that we agree to attack any outside nation, it would mean that if Germany, Austria and Russia should attack France, we should be bound to go in. We could not, under those circumstances, advise our Government to go in. Therefore, if you put in a clause to the effect

that you also agree to declare war if any nation outside of the League goes in and attacks any member inside the League, it could be adopted practically only in case the League virtually included all the great powers of the world, so that those countries included were in force far overwhelming above those which stayed outside. We thought that, as we do not know how far this may go, what countries would at the outset be willing to join it, it was wise to confine it in the first place to defense against other members of the League, believing that that very fact would have a tendency to bring other nations in.

Then the fourth resolution remains unchanged:

Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern the decision of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article One.

The preamble, which is a statement of our reasons for acting, I will read. It is as follows.

(See "Warrant from History," page 3.)

Let me add one more word, to wit, the name of the League. The name "League of Peace," has raised doubts in some people's minds, because it seems to imply merely an aspiration for peace, whereas we mean by this League something more; and, after discussing the various names suggested, we agreed to call it "League to Enforce Peace," and to call this organization the American Branch, hoping and expecting that branches will be formed in other countries.

Now, Mr. President, in the name of the Committee on Resolutions, I move the adoption of these resolutions.

CLOSING REMARKS OF THE CHAIRMAN, The Hon. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

THE CHAIRMAN: I am going to call Mr. John Bassett Moore to the chair. Unfortunately, I have an imperative engagement that takes me away at four o'clock, and I would be glad to have just one word before I go. Mr. Moore, will you be good enough to take the chair?

Mr. Taft: Mr. Chairman: I only want to appeal to the meeting to make some effective result, so that when people consider it, they will think we have done something; that we shall not leave a place open for doubt, but that we shall be able to say "We have agreed on something definite, that indicates that we are in favor of doing something, and not thinking something, and not praying for something." I am in favor of praying for peace just as hard as we can, but I am also in favor of doing the best we can by propositions that will support that prayer.

I am very sorry to have to go, Mr. Chairman, and I wish I could stay longer. I think we have reason to felicitate ourselves on the great gathering that we have had of influential men. We certainly have reason to felicitate ourselves on the warm welcome that we have received from this City of Brotherly Love, and we ought to hope and pray that out of this historic mansion may come a message that shall again help the world. Good-bye.

PERMANENT ORGANIZATION

SUPPLEMENTARY RESOLUTIONS

DR. LOWELL: I want to move one to two supplementary resolutions. One is that our President, Vice-presidents and Executive Committee be made

permanent, and that the Executive Committee be requested to consider and take all proper means for promoting the business of this Conference. There have been various propositions made and sent into it, such as the communication to the President, etc., all of which I think require very careful consideration, and would be more properly done by our Executive Committee than by this body. I want, therefore, if you please, sir, to make that motion.

Motion seconded.

A MEMBER: I should like to ask a question, whether this includes the power on the part of the Executive Committee to call this conference together again.

DR. LOWELL: Oh, certainly, sir, and to add any members it pleases. I take it that an organization of this kind must be managed by a comparatively small body, and I meant to add, Mr. Chairman, that all the members who have accepted invitations to this Conference should be considered permanent members of the League, unless they desire not to.

HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, Virginia: Do you mean that the President, Vice-presidents and Executive Committee are to hold office for life?

DR. LOWELL: Until they call a conference together, and of course they will call a conference together; but I think it is undesirable to provide for annual meetings. I think we had better leave it to the Executive Committee, when in their judgment it is wise to hold such conferences.

THE CHAIRMAN: I will put the question on the motion that the President, Vice-presidents and Executive Committee be made permanent and be authorized to take such measures as may seem to them to be desirable to carry into effect the resolutions of the Conference.

(The motion was put and carried.)

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Vice-Presidents (see page vii)

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*HAMILTON HOLT

*THEODORE MARBURG

Vice-Chairmen

*JOHN BATES CLARK

WILLIAM HODGES MANN

JACOB M. DICKINSON

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*WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, Ex-Officio

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
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